Marxist historiography has always claimed to be "conceptually" rooted in the natural sciences and has therefore been concerned with the function of laws, the structure of theories, and the logical relations between hypotheses and empirical data. Minimal criteria for the identification of a scientific research program as developed by Lakatos and Laudan include: a negative heuristic; explanatory or predictable scientific theories; a central model or paradigm; identification and solution of internal problems; self-conscious awareness by researchers of a common tradition; and the internal dynamics of conflict and convergence. Less than a generation ago, Marxist scholarship seemed to offer the most innovative methodologies in history. More recently, however, Marxist scholarship seems to be reliving old glories while other approaches (psychohistory, quantitative history, and historical anthropology) have advanced more innovative research programs.
Helmut Fleischer has distinguished three different approaches to history in the development of Marx's thinking: the "anthropological" (in the 1844 Manuscripts), the "pragmatological" (in the Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology), and the "nomological" (in the Critique of Political Economy and Capital). However. these represent a less continuous and coherent development than Fleischer claims. The 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse can be instanced as a fourth view, more focused than the others on historiography, and at variance with what Marx says elsewhere. The sequence and overlapping of these four views call into question both the interpretation of Marx's development as smoothly continuous and the interpretation of his development as "ruptured" into "early" and "late." ROBERT (1938) , was the first to attempt to define play and its role in culture, politics, and warfare. Play, he stated, is an activity which exists outside serious life routines, but which immerses the individual totally within its unique boundaries of time and space. The motivation for play is fun rather than material profit. Critics questioned how the higher forms of cultural experience could be at once playful and serious as Huizinga had claimed. Jacques Ehrmann and Eugen Fink concluded that play is not an Urphiinomen distinct from reality. Rather, it is symbolic re-enactment of the world in which men can at once become the subjects and the objects of their activity. We can learn the meaning of existence for a particular society from its play. An epistemological hreak occurred in historical discourse between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries; it is exemplified in the collections of Alexandre Lenoir and Alexandre du Sommerard in the Musee de Cluny. Foucault and later Hayden White identified this break as a transition from the classic to the romantic episteme. The classic eighteenth-century relationship between the historical object and the historical text tended to be reductionist and mechanistic while the nineteenth-century form was more integrated and organic. White treated these relations as modes of discourse and referred to their typological forms as tropes. He referred to the classic and romantic tropes as metonymy and synecdoche, respectively. Lenoir's "metonymic" collection includes as many objects of a period as possible within a space. Du Sommerard, on the other hand, displayed the objects "synecdochically" within a space designed not only to contain them, but to explain their role in the past. Collingwood's faith in the historian's intuitive capacity for discerning the meaning of past actions by re-enactment" is too unqualified. However, his thesis that through actions alone can reasons and inner meanings be discovered is true. This assumes that actions can be traced to recognizable agents and that these agents are able to f I I I INDEX TO VOLUMES XVI-XX acknowledge their reasons. The relation between knowing and doing and between knowing and understanding is a form of causality not inconsistent with teleological reasoning. Characteristic of human action are the constitutive nature of causality, the delimiting effect of rationality on human.!!utonomy, and the role of purpose as a mediating link between intention and outcome. Despite the fact that emphasis on impersonal actions and interactions seriously calls into question Collingwood's theory of understanding, any radical revision of this theory proves no less problematical. 3 F. M. BARNARD, Natural Growth and Purposive Development: Vico and Herder XVIII, "Growth," a term horrowed from biology, is often used to describe change in human history. The use of such terms, however, tends to obscure the fundamental differences between historical and natural causality. Vico and Herder were among the first to make a radical distinction between our understanding of events in nature and of those in human affairs. They argued that man can make conscious decisions which make his actions different from events in the non-
• human world. Yet, they also believed that human history has a purpose of its own, which man cannot alter. However, if human choice is to be truly free, then the outcome of human history cannot be entirely predetermined. Though Vico and Herder, like many other writers, attempted to merge these two notions, they failed to provide a satisfactory theory.
INDEX TO VOLUMES XVI-XX
THOMAS BURGER, Droysen's Defense of Historiography: A Note XVI, 168-173 -;,. During the -ninete'enth century, positivists charged that since historical accounts did not uncover the laws involved in human behavior, they were devoid of significance and should be replaced by sociological studies. Theorists, including Droysen, responded that man has a dual nature. Man's biological self is the inalterable substance of his life, while his spiritual self enables him to create its form. The objects of this creation, social institutions, embody the ideas and ideals of a social order and are transformed when these values change. Remnants of the past are always contained within the new order and thus history both records the past and is embraced by the present. Since man is responsible for his progress he must know the past in order to fully understand and to act in the present. Izenberg states that psychoanalysis should be used only for explaining irrational beliefs. This view of rationality, however, fails to acknowledge the content of rationality. The Frankfurt School of critical theory has argued that such substantive values as freedom and emancipation from domination may direct reason away from current social opinion. In addition, irrational thought may be masked by abstract, instrumental or technical rationality. This situation would be invisible if examined from Jzenberg's ahistorical position. Izenberg also claims that irrational beliefs are independent of any logical process of deliberation. However, this prevents him from examining the truth or falsity of the content of a rational belief. His position supports both absolutist and relativist views which reinforce current ideas and reality. Izenberg offers no way of emancipating man from his present. Psychological theories can be used by historians to bring conceptual order to otherwise random psychological data. Unlike the psychologist, the historian is not required to adopt any single psychological theory, because the explanation of historical events does not depend upon the discovery of a general covering law. Historians, rather, use causal language to describe the linkages, both rational and nonrational, of particular sets of events. Though this form of historical explanation, called the continuous-series approach, can provide a coherent conceptual theory of behavior, it cannot be considered a deductive proof. It is the historian's responsibility to judge both the empirical justification of a psychological theory and the appropriateness of its application to a particular historical context.
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WERNER J. CAHNMAN, Toennies in America XVI, 147-167
The American reaction to Toennies's macrosociological approach was critical and often misunderstood in the first years of the twentieth century. Through the present, American sociology has been concerned primarily with the individual and the relationships of individuals as they are set within a social structure. Toennies, on the other hand, considered the corporation the fundamental unit of sociological studies. He argued that though the corporation is not, in fact, an independent self-activating entity like a person, it is so treated by human volition and in human action. Since the ] 930s, social scientists have used and developed increasingly complex methods of quantitative explanation which have not necessarily made reference to similar developments in logical theory. The "Continuum Hypothesis" problem for logicians was whether higher orders of complexity were accessible to human intuition. Godel argued in 1931 that systems of logic rest on assumptions which exist outside their axioms. For some this meant that complexity is beyond intuition. Others argued that intuitive visualization does not require necessary proof. Set theory and probability theory are constructs which enhance the visualization of infinity. The most recent development has been the notion of a non-CH model which states the conditions under which vision can "compute" a phenomenological universe. It is not a system of proof but a logical program for probabilistic research.
ERIC COCHRANE, The Transition from Renaissance to Baroque: The Case of Italian Historiography XIX, 21-38
The meaning of the term "baroque" has been the subject of much debate. In the field of historiography, historians have not engaged History is not the nature or foundation of knowledge, but is rather a language of cultural conventions concerning remembrances of the past. As a of intellectual history, structuralism argues that historians do not consign meaning to texts of the past. The historians' practice, itself, introduces sense and logic into a past text before that text has meaning. Historical practice, then, presupposes culture. It can be understood by uncovering the linguistic rules which determine what structures and messages can count as historical knowledge. Ideas as different as those of Husser! and Wittgenstein, for example, share the common syntactical basis of philosophy. The primary question for history should not be "What did that mean?" but "How did that phenomenon qualify for a category called history and how has historical writing acquired discursive power?" CHARLES COLLIER, History, Culture, and Communication XX, [150] [151] [152] [153] [154] [155] [156] [157] [158] [159] [160] [161] [162] [163] [164] [165] [166] [167] History, like language and other cultural "systems of signification," depends upon the transmission or communication of meaning in time. This implies that history is subject to a process of cultural selection more characteristic of language and that the true objects of historical research and inquiry must be understood as intended communications. The selection of particular elements for use in a cultural system is made on the basis of which direct but do not determine the form of the culture. These are neither individual nor comprehensive decisions, but rather are general systems of actions, ideas, and beliefs. Nonetheless, a value has been placed on the clements themselves which indicates that, within the system, their significance is recognized and their preservation intended. There exists a link between fame and the culture's perception of its own influence and greatness over time.
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XVI, Veblen used anthropological data as evidence to support and to develop his economic theory. He adopted many of Marx's categories and assumptions to explain the problems of modern capitalist society. Among them were class, alienation, and the essential benevolence of man. Unlike Marx, however, Veblen believed that man has to comprehend before he can act. Man can also not tolerate the disenchantment caused by a purely scientific and rational understanding of the world. Thus, man has a propensity to view the world anthropomorphically, and this separates him from reality. In addition, the instinct toward workmanship which enables man to produce goods to improve his world, also generates new perceptions of and desires for ownership and status. From his study of emulation and comparison among primitive peoples, Veblen concluded that alienation results from the forces of production rather than of Though an increased historical awareness was among the new ideas comprising Indian nationalism, not all leaders shared the same perception of that past. Nehru had no single system of thought but his historical writings show the influence of both Marxist and liberal humanism. He adopted much of the Marxist rhetoric and used concepts such as the polarity of opposing forces. Nehru was concerned not with the role of individuals in history, but with the daily lives, values, and tradition of civilizations. He also considered economics the primary causal factor in history. Yet, Nehru had been heavily influenced by Gandhi and could not subscribe to the violence implicit in the Marxist resolution of conflict. He held mixed views on capitalism. Nehru understood its potential benefit to human welfare, but he also believed that it generates a decline in the spirit of a civilization far more destructive than foreign attack. Knowledge, including historical knowledge, is dependent upon the procedure by which it is acquired. Nowell-Smith attempts to drive a logical wedge between the assertion of historical statements and the objects to which they refer. This distinction between assertion and referent, however, does not exist in the practice of history. In historical study there is no way to acquire knowledge except through the construction of theory. The brute sensory data which form an essential part of an understanding of the present are not available to historians. As far as the epistemology of history is concerned, the real past has no influence on historical knowledge. Though truth may be the object of the historical enterprise, it cannot be obtained except through theory, and is, therefore, inseparable from the infrastructure of that enterprise.
EUGENE O. GOLOB, The Irony of Nihilism XIX, Bei. 19, [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] Hayden White intends his. Metahistory to be a contribution to the current discussion of.the problem of historical knowledge. In the debate between the positivist and idealist schools, White disclaims both the positivist prescriptions for history as a science, and the idealist perspective of history as an autonomous discipline. Rather, he argues that historians cannot tell the truth about the past because of the limitations inherent in the linguistic structure of texts. White concludes then that the writing of history is aesthetic and moral rather than cognitive. Philosophers such as Collingwood disagree with this perspective and argue that content disciplines and limits the narrative imagination. By abandoning the positivist requirement of universal explanatory laws, one can view human action as infinitely complex and subject perpetually to disagreement and revision. By abandoning the criterion of truth White has destroyed personal responsibility and ultimately freedom itself.
• MICHAEL GOODlCH, A Note on Sainthood in the Hagiographical Prologue XX, 168-174
In the thirteenth century, the hagiographical prologue gave its authors an opportunity to reflect upon the theological implications of Catholic sainthood and to define the role of the saint in the divine scheme of salvation. The hagiographers were most frequently either monks or philosophers, and whereas the former would assume a humble stance, the latter would display their dialectical skill. Hagiographers used the opportunity of the prologue to answer critics and to criticize the learned disciplines, especially philosophy. The structure was usually two-part (life and miracles), with an occasional post-mortem. Though most were modeled after the traditional "florilegia," some authors grappled with theological issues. History, more than other subjects, is confronted with the need to understand the nature of social time. Braudel, representing the objectivist approach, argued that there exists a universal objective world-time permeated by diverse tempi and rhythms. Althusser criticized this view by stating that each level (economic, political, and scientific) within society has its own set of temporal relations. However, Althusser's argument requires not the rejection, but the further understanding of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In order for his concepts to have meaning, they must be based on the meaningful intersubjcctive relationships of the participants. There is a gap bctween the philosophical concept of subjective meaning and historical practice. Four phenomenological ideal types of timesynchronic, diachronic, specific, and eternal can be used to replace objective history with a "history" of times.
CYNTHIA HAY, Historical Theory and Historical Confirmation XIX, [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] In his book Our Knowledge of the Historical Past, Murray Murphey argued that historians develop their own theories rather than rely on those of social science. Even the most empirical history uses constructed inferences when it identifies, explains, or interprets historical phenomena. Historical theories often invoke the coveringlaw model. Though historians arc often unaware of their use of theory, their schemata are not different in kind from those of other disciplines. However, Murphey's notion of historical covering laws cannot support the kinds of counterfactuals used in science. Moreover, since historians are not always explicit or rigorous about their use of theory, it is unlikely that such interpretations can fulfill the analytical criteria of the sciences. Finally, Murphey contradicts himself in his discussion of historical confirmation whcn he demonstrates the difficulty of establishing the empirical adequacy of historical theory.
Historians must have an understanding of the present both to reo construct the past and to explain that reconstruction to a contemporary audience. One criticism of presentism is that it is an interpretation of the past in terms of current values and ideas, and fails to provide a complete picture of the historical context. Regardless of such practices, however, the historian is limited to the methodological and archival tools available during his own time. Meaning, reason, and truth are different for different periods and peoples. The clarity of his language, the consistency of his logic, and the validity of his proofs are relative to the historian's time and culture. The act of historical inquiry is influenced by the contrasts between past and present. Only by consciously addressing his dependence on the present can the historian adequately understand the past. The "history of mentalities" considers the attitudes of ordinary people to everyday life. The approach is closely identified with the work of the Annales schoo!. However, whereas the Annales historians refer to the material factors which condition human life, historians investigating mentalities examine psychological underpinnings. Historians who first developed guidelines for the history of mentalities were Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, who were both concerned with collective systems of belief. Later, Philippe Aries and Norbert Elias identified and developed theories on early childhood. Finally, Michel Foucault considered the psychology of social deviants and nonconformists. This mode of interpretation provides a means of examining those aspects of life which the linear approach cannot address, such as the pressure of conformity, the sense of accelerating time, and the preoccupation with self.
• PHILIP J. KAIN, Marx's Dialectic Method XIX, 294-312
The current issue over Marx's Grundrisse and Capital is whether these works represent a unity with or a rupture from his earlier writings. A third interpretation is more adequate than either of these: the new "dialectic method" of the later works transforms elements of his earlier outlooks into a new synthesis. In earlier works Marx describes three processes: the historical generation of the concrete, the historical development of categories, and the methodological ordering of these categories. However, his views changed on which of these processes are primary. In the later works, the third process independent; this modifies his view of the other two processes, and thereby of the relation of consciousness and laws of social development to material conditions. PHILIP J. KAlN In Metahistory, White establishes a self-contained system of historical criticism which uses the nineteenth-century historical tradition as its direction and current cultural politics as its strategy. He argues that the flow of human events over time results from an interaction between the rules of tradition and the human mastery of that tradition through free will. After the spirit of Vico and Nietzsche, White considers the historical text a narrative representation which subsumes the logic of explanation. Rather than psychology and sociology, White chooses the trope as the basis of his linguistic system. Within his four-trope system, White identifies his own position as that of the ironic trope. Given tropology as the irreducible element, the four levels themselves become tropological. Metahistory is Metaphoric as it reaffirms human freedom through the creative use of language and Ironic because the rules of discourse place such affirmation "under erasure." Formerly, history was considered a discipline which attempts to arrive at a description of how the past really was. The truth of historical arguments could then be verified by evidence. This Rankean notion of historical realism is currently rejected by many historians because the evidence upon which it depends is itself theorybound. This critical or "ironic" perspective, however, like the realist descriptions it criticizes, cannot provide a single method of accounting for events. The structuralist theory developed by Hayden White attempts to resolve this conflict by taking as its object not experience, but men's various representations of experience. However, to claim that truth depends upon criteria outside of the evidence renders the historian subject to either relativism or dogmatism. Only through a nontheoretical faith in the power of evidence to prove can historical inquiry uncover the true past.
DOMINICK LACAPRA, Habermas and the Grounding of Critical Theory XVI, 237-264
The introduction and appendices to Habermas's texts reveal, both explicitly and implicitly, some inner contestations within his social theory. Habermas attempts to ground critical theory in a philosophical anthropology based upon quasi-transcendental cognitive interests and an ideal speech situation involving a consensus theory of truth. Unlike other expositors of dialectical theory, Habermas fails to address systematically the notion of supplementarity. Thus the dichotomous typologies of his analysis appear frozen within the existing ideological framework and some are in conflict with the emancipatory aspect of his theory. Habermas must clarify the overlapping character of his categories and recognize the logic of harmony implicit within his analyses in order to make his theory compatible with his criticism. Within his metahistorical thesis, White makes three assumptions about the nature of historical writing. First, he argues that "histories proper" and "philosophies of history" differ in emphasis and not in content because both share a common narrative strategy. However, White fails to acknowledge the vast differences in scope, principles of interpretation, and meaning between the two disciplines. Second, White assumes that the activity of ordering the historical text is a poetic act. This approach ignores the fact that events and the relationships of those events exist prior to and independent of the historical account. Moreover, his tropological structures are too inflexible to provide a useful understanding of historical discourse. Finally, he never questions the validity of viewing an historical work as a purely linguistic structure. In fact, whereas "histories proper" seem to have much in common to compare and to evaluate, "philosophies of history" almost never agree. Weber's methodological writings reveal an epistemological tension between an interpretative and a scientific conception of knowledge. He argues that social action has to be understood in terms of its subjective meaning for individuals, and that this action is not necessarily consistent or logical. On the other hand, however, this action can only be scientifically studied through the use of categories and models based on logic. In theory, this creates a tension between his concepts of the "method of understanding" and of "adequacy at the level of meaning." In practice, Weber resolves this methodological conflict. As he uses them, the categories of value and of knowledge derive from and reflect a universal structure of noological substratum of human thought. The thoughts and ideas of both social actor and social scientist are formed from a single objective basis. During the modern period, thinkers have asked two fundamental questions about Greek historiography. The first concerns the compatibility of Greek historiography with the Biblical vision of the world, and the second compares the Greek vision with modern historiographical views. The status of history was never clearly settled among the Greeks, though it never replaced or was accepted by Greek philosophy and religion. Greek historiography progressed from an essentially local, ethnographic, and mythological practice, to the more national concerns of war and politics. Greek history was not incompatible with Christian ethics. However, because human destiny was not its object, the Christian and modern moral questions about truth and value were not rigorously explored. In addition, the modern demands for proof and validity in the use of evidence were not fulfilled.
ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO, A Note on Max Weber's Definition of Judaism as a Pariah-Religion XIX, 313-318
Max Weber introduced the term "pariah" into the scientific study of Judaism and defined it as the voluntary religious and moral segregation of a people from their host culture. However, problems arise with his explanation. First, Weber defines "guest people" as a group lacking an autonomous political organization but fails to explain why this occurred. Second, he suggests an "ethic of resentment" between those in a "pariah" status and others, but fails to provide evidence that such an attitude existed for the early Jews. Third, he obscures the description of when and where Jews became "pariahs." It seems that Weber misinterpreted the religious segregation dictated by the Talmud with actual legal separation effected by the particular society in which Jews resided. The juridical pact between God and the Jewish nation led to self-regulation rather than the self-abasement characteristic of pariah nations. .age, use of tropology, and adherence to formalism render his theory abistorical. However, like White, she fails to define either her terms or her rationale for contrasting tropological with topological rhetoric, fails to take responsibility for our times, and fails to delineate clearly her views 00 the dynamics of history. What is required is further research and elaboration of White's tropal philosophy. A program for this study includes the clarification of a rhetoric for 'inquiry, of tropes, and of elective affinity. These concepts should then be applied systematically to the disciplines of social science and to philosophy of history. White's concept of irony must also be isolated, sorted, and examined for its resistance to isolation and sorting. Finally, one must address the principles of politics which underlie these concepts, this text, and ultimately texts in general.
MAROlT HURUP NIELSEN, Re-enactment and Reconstruction in Collingwood's Philosophy of History XX, 1-31
Collingwood's re-enactment doctrine, the notion that the historian must re-enact the past in his own mind, forms the methodological pillar of Collingwood's constructivism. The first tenet of this interpretation states that for the past to be knowable it must have left traces analyzable in the present. Second, the historical process must be rational, which necessitates that the object of knowledge be "re-enactable" and that the subject of knowledge (the historian) be "re-eoact-capable." Third, both subject and object must come in contact in an actual act of knowing. Finally, criticism and justification of this reconstruction must constantly take place in order to assure that this reconstruction is actual. This interpretation was developed by Collingwood over several of his works. Our understanding of it is clarified by a study of his unpublished manuscripts, which have only recently been made accessible. The constr.uctionist thesis of history states, in general, that the historian must construct a theory to explain the past. Some, including Leon Goldstein, attempt to push this formulation beyond a description of historical methodology. They argue that since the real past is inaccessible to present the real past can have no relevance for historiography. The distinctions made between the present, the real past, and the historical past generate problems with the concepts of past and present knowledge, theoretical infrastructure and experience, verification and truth, conflicting historical theories, and observation and knowledge. Goldstein's formulation of the constructionist thesis assumes the conflicting positions that experiential perception is paradigmatic of all methods of acquiring knowledge, and that knowledge is itself a kind of experience. As well as conflicting with commonsense views, his thesis is internally incoherent.
GUY OAKES, The Verstehen Thesis and the Foundations of Max Weber's Methodology
XVI, 11-29
The Verstehen thesis is Weber's method for identifying and understandi ng sociocultural phenomena. He assumes that, as the study of meaningful human conduct, the social sciences (unlike the natural sciences), must recognize that the actor who participates in cultural activities has already defined those actions. Only actions which have meaning for the agent can count as sociocultural phenomena. Weber's exposition of the Verstehen thesis is scattered among many of his essays and criticisms in the form of illustrations and examples, consistent with his belief that sociocultural investigation requires flexible programs rather than a permanent conceptual scheme. He observed that the Methodenstreit of his day created a crisis of the social sciences because of the excessive emphasis on methodological issues, and he proposed the Verstehen thesis as a solution to this early twentieth-century crisis. Though Nietzsche never developed a theory of history, his comments on time yield a radical approach to historical interpretation. Central to this philosophy is the concept of eternal recurrence. Time, with neither boundary nor purpose, returns from the past to repeat itself in its same form. This generates a psychological and moral problem for men, as it fails to provide the elements of meaning which Nietzsche considered essential to the human psyche. Men survive the aimlessness of history by living in the unhistorical consciousness of the immediate present. Nietzsche's ideal is the suprahistorical man, whose awareness of history, and his disgust with it, lead him to find meaning in the structure of time a structure of meaninglessness. The value system of history is this will to power and precludes the extension of historical judgment to situations beyond the sphere of inquiry.
PIDLIP POMPER,
History
Typologies and Cycles in Intellectual XIX, Bei. 19, [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] • Hayden White, in Metahistory, rejects the psychological basis of language and, rather, emphasizes its formal characteristics. However, White assumes the existence of psychological phenomena such as "levels of consciousness" and imagination, which effectively undermines his synthetic principle. Another problem in White's theory is that he only describes the four phases of transition in public moods. His theory, then, suffers from the lack of a dynamic principle of change. In addition, his concept of "dialogical tension" appears a "catch-all" device for dealing with inconsistencies rather than a comprehensive analytical tool. The four typologies themselves assume a deep structure which provides heuristic value at the price of causal explanation. Finally, White attempts to use the trope of Irony as a dynamic principle. However, Irony has no formal restrictions and seems itself founded on disagreement rather than ultimate generative principles. His analysis would have been more convincing if it were limited to a description of literary subcultures rather than assuming theoretical coherence. , ·The predominant scholarly opinion argues that, for the ancients, the idea of history held no meaning because time was regarded as a circular pattern in which events are repeated. Only human thought and art were meaningful. This opinion, however, is based on an a priori definition of history as the whole temporal process. If the term "history" is examined from the standpoint of its use during antiquity, the analyses of the notions of time and history change. Rather than being regarded as circular and repetitious, time had no pattern at all. Though this concept posed some philosophical problems for ancient thinkers, including Aristotle, time was not discussed as a medium of history. The interest in history as an academic discipline and its view as a linear process with an origin and an end independent of human thought occurred only with the gradual and rhetorical transition to Judaeo-Christian belief.
JOHN PAUL RIQUELME, The Historical consciousness refers not only to a knowledge of the past but implies the use of that knowledge to understand the future. Many elements blur our perception of history as it regards current political action. It may cripple us with the realization of the relative inability of individuals to effect change. In addition, our memories of the past tend to be selective and short. We may remember falsity rather than truth. History, itself, may be used as evidence in the support of particular political positions merely for the benefit of a single group. Nonetheless, all of us are affected to some extent by the understanding of our historical traditions and in its best form this knowledge leads us from legend toward truth. The current trend to ignore historical education could prevent us from learning that the truth of the past forms the core of our knowledge of the future. XVIII, 41-51 , In 1783, during the height of the German Enlightenment, August Ludwig Schlozer published this essay on history as an autonomous critical science. Schlozer had helped to establish history as an independent academic discipline at Gottingen University. His essay outlines four criteria for criticizing historical work. Such pieces should be true, complete, broad in scope, and well written. Though the Greeks were fine painters of history, their accounts could not match the first three of these ideals. The most thorough history would probably require separate individuals to undertake the collection, verification, and editing of usable information. Only then could the results be written by a "historical painter." Schlozer undertook all of these tasks himself in his five-volume work on ancient Russia, entitled Nestor.
JEAN SEZNEC, Michelet in Germany: A Journey in Self-Discovery XVI, 1-10
Michelet's historical writings blend the romantic characteristics of the erotic, the funereal, and the demoniac. These writings formed the artistic expression of a personality obsessed with the erotic fantasies of death -particularly the death of women. Michelet belieyed that he was beckoned by the dead to resurrect their exist-
' . ence and to understand them better than they had understood themselves. -He endeavored to identify himself with the dead in order to relive, rather than simply to collect, their experiences. Though called to his art, he feared its tendency to isolate him from nature, from common men, and from himself. During the revolutionary mid-nineteenth century in Germany and Prussia, Droysen advocated political change from the standpoint of a neo-Hegelian scholar. He justified his commitment to both political partisanship and historical scholarship through the use of a theological conceptual base. Droysen believed that free will and necessity exist as interdependent forces in the world. Whereas God's divine purpose can only be realized through acts of free will, such acts occur when necessary. Christian faith and historical understanding ensure free will. History is not a conservative force as it has the right to create and to destroy. Droysen favored the rise of the modern state and argued that the modern drive for power would eventually lead to political freedom. Through unity and participation, the state enables individuals to realize their moral potential. The classical conception of truth requires modification in order to apply to historical narratives. Historians do not simply discover the past but constitute certain facts about it. The logic of historical narratives is distinctive in three ways. First, the truth of component statements does not guarantee the truth of the whole. Second, narrative may be true as a whole even though some of its statements are false. Finally, a greater proportion of true statements in one narrative does not necessarily make it truer than another. The "vertical" structure of the historical narrative consists of the articulated surface stratum, the implicit surface stratum, and the deep (latent or theoretical) stratum. The truth of a narrative is primarily determined by the third of these. Comte is best known for his law of three states. According to this law, history necessarily develops through three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific. However, the notion of "development" takes on three meanings within his works. First, he describes it as the unfolding of an inherent principle of growth analogous to the individual life process. Second, development is a causal sequence for organic growth. The individual's life is not the fulfillment of an immanent purpose but is the outcome of past achievements. Finally, Comte considered change a progressive elaboration through a variety of environments. Though history had an end, events are not a contingent sequence of steps toward that end, but are rather anticipations of it. Comte's paradigms of the process of secularization demonstrate the importance of these distinctions. 
